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Statement

by

Ambassador Zamir Akram,
Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the
United Nations, Geneva
at the
First Committee Thematic Debate
on Nuclear Weapons
(68th Session of the UNGA)

New York, 18 October 2013
Mr. Chairman,

Today, global efforts to regulate, reduce and prevent the spread of armaments, particularly nuclear weapons, are facing serious challenges. Thirty five years ago, the General Assembly reached consensus on the mandate and machinery to pursue the disarmament agenda. Over time, this consensus has broken down and the shared goal of nuclear disarmament has become elusive.

Despite reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, nuclear disarmament remains an outstanding objective on the international security agenda.

A progressive erosion of the international consensus on arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament norms, rules and mechanisms is evident from the following developments:

a) disavowal by most of the NPT Nuclear Weapon States of complete Nuclear Disarmament;
b) the prolonged non-entry into force of the CTBT, and prospects of new tests by some States;
c) the existence of doctrines envisaging the use of nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear weapon States;
d) pursuit of selective non-proliferation, exceptionalism and discriminatory conditions for peaceful nuclear cooperation;
e) growing asymmetry in military power among States;
f) the danger of acquisition of Weapons of Mass Destruction by terrorists and other non-state actors;
g) the inability of the disarmament machinery to evolve consensus on any of the issues that are on its agenda;

Both non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are important for international peace and security. Their simultaneous pursuit alone can erect effective barriers against risks of proliferation and promote disarmament. The so-called step-by-step approach alone is subterfuge to oppose the aim of nuclear disarmament. The determination of few powerful states to retain the nuclear weapons while prescribing strict regimes for the weaker states only aggravates the sense of insecurity among states.

Mr. Chairman,

Despite high rhetoric and moralistic assertions, the fact is that nuclear weapons remain integral to strategic doctrines of military alliances. Nuclear weapons also provide extended deterrence to non-nuclear weapon states who are members of military alliances. As such these states indirectly and implicitly encourage the possession or even use of nuclear weapons as part of the strategic doctrines of their alliances.

Pakistan recognizes that nuclear disarmament will not happen overnight or even in a life time. But the effort to eliminate nuclear weapons must start now – it has been too long since SSOD-I for us to give practical shape to obligations adopted by consensus.
Mr. Chairman,

Pakistan believes that a rules-based, equitable and non-discriminatory international order needs to be evolved that must pursue a comprehensive disarmament agenda. This agenda should build upon existing achievements and should include measures to:

i) Address security concerns of states.

ii) Carry forward strategic and conventional weapons limitation and reductions. Unilateral and bilateral measures undertaken by some are partial, insufficient and cannot substitute implementation of multilateral disarmament obligations.

iii) Strengthen the international non-proliferation regime through policies that are equitable, criteria-based and non-discriminatory. There should be no exceptionalism or preferential treatment driven by motivations of power and profit.

iv) There should be an end to horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. Extending nuclear deterrence to alliance partners amounts itself to horizontal proliferation.

v) Negative security assurances should be extended to non-nuclear weapons states. These assurances are cost free and do not undermine security of Nuclear Weapons States.

vi) Instead of half measures, disowning obligations to disarm and by advocating a treaty banning only the future production of fissile material – which is not even a non-proliferation measure – there should be a reduction of existing fissile material stocks as well, which will be a genuine step towards elimination of nuclear weapons.

vii) Along with these steps the international community should immediately start negotiations on a Convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time frame.

Mr. Chairman,

For a vast majority of States, nuclear disarmament remains the highest priority on the international security agenda, despite equivocation by some NWS. The raison d’être of the Conference on Disarmament is to negotiate nuclear disarmament. Yet, after the lapse of more than three decades, the goal of negotiating and concluding a Convention as nuclear disarmament is as elusive as ever.

In the past four years some States have taken upon themselves to shift the goal post in terms of priorities on the international security agenda. Their efforts to project the FMCT as the “new” priority and the only “ripe” issue betray facts on the ground.

Some States have asserted that national security concerns can and should be addressed during the negotiations in the CD on an FMCT. We could not agree more as long as these States apply the
same logic to the other three core issues on the CD’s agenda. Going by this reasoning of some States, the contentious aspects of nuclear disarmament should not have stalled start of negotiations on this “priority” and “over-ripe” agenda item for more than three decades. If States that have been opposing negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the CD have legitimate security concerns, they should openly state their reasons. Since they have chosen not to do so raises serious questions regarding their motives and commitment to nuclear disarmament and indeed to the work of CD itself.

Mr. Chairman,

Pakistan welcomes the first ever summit at the UN General Assembly on nuclear disarmament. We support the NAM statement delivered at the meeting as well as the draft resolution presented by NAM as a follow-up to the HLM. The adoption of this resolution will reaffirm the “ripeness” of nuclear disarmament. It will also reinforce what constitutes a priority of the international community i.e. early commencement of negotiations in the CD on a comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention.

Mr. Chairman,

The UN Charter obligates all States not to use or threaten to use force. This obligation extends to nuclear weapons as well. The demand for negative security assurances was raised by the non-nuclear-weapons States in the 1960s in pursuit of their security to which they have a right under the UN Charter.

Pakistan, along with a vast majority of UN Member-States believes that this issue is ripe for negotiations at the CD. It would also contribute to building a climate of trust and understanding and could contribute to easing of current strains on the wider disarmament and non-proliferation agenda.

Mr. Chairman,

Efforts are long due to craft a renewed consensus on nuclear disarmament and elimination of nuclear weapons. Without underestimating the potential challenges in evolving a reenergized global consensus, efforts need to be redoubled for a world genuinely without nuclear weapons. Pakistan reiterates the longstanding call by the 120 members Non Aligned Movement to convene a Fourth Special Session of the General Assembly (SSOD-IV) to revive a global consensus that ensures elimination of nuclear weapons, while meeting the security concerns of all states.

Mr. Chairman,

In regard to the issue of negative security assurances, Pakistan is presenting the traditional draft resolution A/C.1/68/L-49 entitled: “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons”, on behalf of the delegations of Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nicaragua, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela (Bolivian Republic of’) and Viet Nam.
Raised by non-nuclear-weapon States in the 1960s, the demand for security assurances crystallized in 1968 during the final phase of NPT negotiations. However, the response of the nuclear-weapon States reflected in Resolution 255 of the Security Council was not adequate. At the first Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament, it was agreed to conclude an international instrument to provide binding and credible negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States. However, the declarations made by the four of the five nuclear-weapon States at SSOD-I and, later, at the NPT Extension Conference and reflected in Resolution 984 of the Security Council, were also considered insufficient, qualified and partial by most of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Such factors lend great urgency to the task of conclusion of credible negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States. The co-sponsors of the draft resolution seek to underline this sense of urgency and to see it being translated into concrete action.

Similar to the drafts adopted at previous First Committee sessions, this draft resolution has been technically updated. Reaffirming the urgent need to reach an early agreement of effective international arrangements on negative security assurances, the draft notes with satisfaction that there is no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention on this subject. It appeals to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to work towards an early agreement and recommends further intensification of efforts to evolve a common approach and a common formula on this issue. Finally, it recommends to the Conference on Disarmament to actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on negative security assurances.

My delegation and the co-sponsors look forward to the adoption of draft resolution contained in document L-49 with the widest possible support.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman